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Introduction
One of the noticeable trends in European politics in the past decade has been
the decline of the traditional center-left parties. This is described by the popular
term "PASOKification," named after the Panhellenic Socialist Movement
(PASOK) of Greece and its epic fall from power in the 2010s. However, despite
the popular commentary about such decline, is there any objective evidence for this
supposed decline? Or is it a transformation of the party system to be expected in
any democracy? We will attempt to answer these questions in our survey. First, the
article defines key concepts to clarify our analysis. Then, our theoretical framework
will be established to guide and structure our study. Next, we will establish a
hypothesis and then test it via a qualitative case study method. Finally, we shall
conclude the analysis and explore future research opportunities and possible
extensions.
Center-left parties in Europe have traditionally been major players in
European politics and remain so today. However, what exactly is a center-left
party? This can be a vague and broad term that covers various political groupings.
Center-left is understood to be more moderate than and not as radical as others on
the left are. For example, the French Socialist Party, "a deeply ambivalent
relationship between the French Socialist Party and political radicalism" (Cole,
2011). Center-left parties want to hold power and play the role of reformer. The
position of center-left parties is both to hold power and wield it. "The party's line
in favor of participation in office," revolutionary actions outside the system is not
the goal (Cole, 2011). Thus a center-left party sits on the left of the political
spectrum but seeks change from within the system. For example, the Swedish
Social Democratic Party in the 1930s used its control of parliament to bring about
significant reforms (Berman, 2019). This staved off more radical parties on the left
and cemented their political power. Center-left parties also tend to put on a more
explicit appeal to national identity, unlike others on the left who feel national
identity is less important. "The national 'project' of the center-left" (Pearce and
Kenny, 2015) thus is to reform a country and make it more equitable, but not to
overthrow the system or transform the state in a revolutionary manner.
The center-left is defined as a political party on the left that is reformist
rather than revolutionary. However, the above definition is more ideological and
includes a broad range of political parties. Thus to narrow the scope of parties we
discuss in this inquiry, we must look at the parties that are not just the center-left
but are traditional parties of power. That is parties that have won and held elective
office. They have formed the government on the national level. For example, it is
agreed that France's main center-left party is the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste in
French or PS). Also, in the United Kingdom (hereafter Britain), the Labour Party
is the main center-left party there. In Germany, the Social Democratic Party (SPD)

is usually the traditional center-left party. However, a better way to narrow the
scope is to look at the membership of the Socialist and Democrats group. The S&D
group is the largest center-left party in Europe and is currently the second-largest
group in the European Parliament. In the most recent election, they won 153 seats
to the parliament, just behind the conservative European People's Party (IFES,
2019). This article will examine the membership of this group as the criteria for
which center-left parties. Since the group contains over 30 plus members (S&D,
2020), a sample of the specific members will be taken. For the inquiry, we will look
at four parties from prominent European countries. The four parties to be selected
are the Socialist Party of France, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the
Democratic Party of Italy, and the Labour Party of Britain.
What distinguishes these four parties is the decline in popular support that
all four have suffered in recent years. For example, the Socialist Party of France
has lost considerable support in recent elections and is now in opposition. The
Labour Party has been in opposition since 2010 and has lost four general elections
in a row. The Democratic Party has remained the second-largest party and is in
government but has not seen its support increase from its height in the earlier part
of the 2010s. The Social Democrats have remained in government since 2013, but
their popular support has declined significantly in recent years. This article aims to
try to find out what has caused this decline in support. Why have these four parties
have seen declines? What does this tell us about the state of European politics at
large?
Theory
Politics is often influenced by people's values and the culture of the country
that is relevant. It is easy to see that recent events have influenced people's values,
translating to their electoral preferences. All of the parties mentioned earlier have
roots dating back to the late 19th century or reflect political traditions dating back
to that era. The Democratic Party of Italy is the youngest of the group (founded in
2007) but reflects older political traditions in Italy. This includes Catholic leftists
who have long been influential in Italian politics, with "in particular the formation
of a new 'progressive Catholic' elite was strongly influenced by the experience of
Lega democratica" (Biondi, 2016). Lega democratica was a Catholic leftist party
that worked with elements of the fallen Communist Party to oppose the new Italian
right of the 1990s (Biondi, 2016). What is important to understand is that these
groups represent an older, more class-based type of politics. Labour was founded
because working-class individuals could find representation. The Social Democrats
and Socialists both reflect this working-class orientation. Most center-left parties
reflect the tradition of working-class representation and looking out for the interests
of the working class. Business traditionally aligned with the center-right to protect

its interests, with the Conservative Party of Britain serving as "its political
representative for a century" (McMenamin, 2019). However, this class-based type
of politics has not been the same since the end of the 20th century. For example,
when Labour was founded in 1901, most working-class Britons likely worked in
factories or resource extraction (i.e., coal mining). However, today,
deindustrialization has hit, and the coal mines have all but closed in Britain. The
tertiary sector (aka service sector) now dominates in Europe. With this economic
shift, a shift in values has occurred, and thus one can say people's values have
changed with it. Also, when values start to shift, so do the issues that people care
about.
Robert Inglehart and Pippa Norris propose a "silent revolution" that has
occurred in societal values. They point out that Western societies after World War
II, "experienced peace, unprecedented prosperity, and the emergence of advanced
welfare states, making survival more secure than ever before" (Inglehart and Norris,
2017). Now suddenly, the working classes who once faced abject poverty and
excessive mortality no longer necessarily had to fear for their survival. Thus new
values began to sweep in to fill the void, what the authors called "post-materialist
values." In other words, one's material survival was now a given, and thus other
issues became more important. However, post-material values "were most
prevalent among the younger and more secure strata of high-income countries"
(Inglehart and Norris, 2017). They were not the necessary positions of the less
secure. When the post-war boom came to an end in the 1970s and 1980s, working
classes who skewed lower-income and older began to react to post-material values.
"This triggered a cultural backlash among older and less-secure people who were
disoriented by the erosion of familiar values (Inglehart and Norris, 2017). Focused
more on traditional materialist values, they began to react in a backlash towards the
perceived erosion of the societies they once knew. In other words, this silent
revolution in values, which center-left parties adopted, resulted in a backlash that
may have helped feed their declining support.
This hypothesis of the so-called silent revolution is rooted in the literature
on new social movements. "The new social movements are environmental, antinuclear, peace, feminist, and gay and lesbian" (Handler, 1992). According to
Handler, these new social movements were less concerned with socioeconomic
concerns than with cultural ones. "The Materialist/Postmaterialist dimension has
become the basis of a major new axis of political polarization in Western Europe"
(Inglehart and Norris, 2017). With the significant cultural changes, now these new
social movements began to bring the center-left with them. All of this centers on
the idea of post-modernism. According to Handler, "The major theme in postmodernism that I emphasize is subversion, the commitment to undermine dominant
discourse" (Handler, 1992). In Europe, "political protest in Europe since 2000 with
the emergence of the global justice movement" (Peterson et al., 2015).

Post-modernism does not accept broad themes or universal truths. Instead,
it sees truth from the specific context in which that truth exists. It is not inaccurate
to say that post-modernism is a type of cultural relativism. New social movements
such as human rights, peace, anti-nuclear, LGBT, challenged the traditional social
narratives and demanded change. "Though recruited from the more secure strata
that traditionally supported conservative parties, they have gravitated toward
parties of the Left, supporting political and cultural change" (Inglehart and Norris,
2017). There have been some challenges to this framework, such as the recent antiausterity protests motivated by opposition to cuts to public services. Peterson et al.
have noted that these protests are motivated by a sense of economic survival and
injustice. This may well indicate that the new social movements have continued to
exist with the older labor movements. Material concerns do not disappear but now
appear to flare up when economic crises occur rather more consistently. This
theoretical framework explains why electoral preferences have changed so much in
recent decades. Center-left parties have been influenced by these new values and
have begun to shift away from their traditional class-based approaches towards a
more culturally oriented approach. As culture has changed over the last forty years,
political preferences would inevitably change as well. The framework of the silent
revolution and post-modernism also gives us a window into how nothing is static
and things do change over time. Post-modernism is premised on challenging
traditional narratives and challenging them. It also makes sense that this framework
would include a backlash from those who see it as a challenge to their world.
"The Postmaterialist Left appeals primarily to a middle-class constituency
and is only faintly interested in the classic program of the Left" (Inglehart and
Norris, 2017). Inglehart and Norris refer to the idea that traditional left-wing parties
are interested in redistribution and economic security for their constituents. Thus
the support for the welfare state, income redistribution, and limits on business. As
an example, the French Socialist Party in the 2017 presidential election. The two
leading candidates had quite different visions of what the party should emphasize.
Manuel Valls emphasized a platform that was "business-friendly, pro-European
(including full acceptance of the Eurozone and its constraints) and socially liberal"
(Hanley, 2017). While Benoit Hamon emphasized a more traditional platform,
"argued against austerity in favor of a universal income, talked about how to tackle
unemployment in a future where high-tech robots would change the nature of
productivity and called for a greening of the economy" (Hanley, 2017). This is only
one case, but it demonstrates the changes within the center-left in recent years. Once
center-left parties were defined usually by concern for economic issues contrasted
by a more post-materialist-oriented approach. Hamon ultimately won the Socialist
Party's nomination for president but failed to make it to the second round.
Emmanuel Macron, the eventual winner, took on a platform with eerie similarities
to Valls. His platform was to "be built on increased economic and cultural

liberalism, but with some redistribution" (Hanley, 2017). This example
demonstrates that the theoretical framework presented by Inglehart and Norris
along with the post-modernism and new social movement literature can present us
with a picture that can help explain the decline of center-left parties and their recent
struggles at the polls.
Hypothesis
The decline of center-left parties is an observable phenomenon across
Europe in recent years. "Once-strong center-left parties…are also near historic lows
in terms of their most recent legislative election results" (Taylor, 2018). The four
parties that we have selected for this article all have seen their support decline in
recent years, and they are struggling in recent years. "The French Socialist Party,
German Social Democratic Party and Dutch Labor Party – three other major leftof-center parties – recorded their worst-ever results in the postwar era" (Taylor,
2018). Using the theoretical framework above, we will work out whether this
decline results from changing politics or voters seeking out new options. Instead,
we can say that it is likely changing cultural values as exemplified by the rise of
post-materialist values and their adoption by the center-left parties that have caused
their electoral base of the working class to disappear. As the traditional causes that
the center-left supported have become less important, the working class feel
threatened in their economic security and social position. The new importance of
immigration and culture indicates that new political cleavages are appearing and
that center-left parties are in an impossible position. Either embrace social
liberalism and risk the loss of working-class support that comes with it or have a
more traditional program and step away from socially liberal values, but in the
process lose the support of progressives. Center-left parties have always been
alliances between the working class and social liberals/progressives. Now it seems
that as voters polarize along lines concerning culture and identity, center-left parties
cannot please all and have seen their support sap away in the meantime.
Methodology
The methodology for this study shall be a qualitative case study of each case
and then identifying common patterns. These common patterns will be used to draw
conclusions that will either confirm or reject our hypothesis. Case studies are
narratives that tell a story about a situation and make observations about it. Here
we examine each case and try to tell why these parties have ended up in the situation
that they have ended up in. Quantitative methods will not be effective here since
we are dealing with cultural values and the actions of individuals and institutions.
These are not necessarily things that can be quantified or explained by

mathematical means. Qualitative methods include: "case study methods, small N
analysis, comparative methods, concept analysis, the logic of inquiry, comparative
historical methods, the ethnographic tradition of field research, constructivist
methods, interpretive methods" (Bevir and Kedar, 2008). A case study is defined
by Joe Feagin, "an in-depth, multifaceted investigation, using qualitative research
methods, of a single social phenomenon" (Feagin, 1991 (2)). Thus, it is the best
method to use here.
The case study method is necessary for our study of the phenomena. The
case study looks at one phenomenon: here the decline of support of European
center-left parties. We can look at various factors to help explain this situation. The
case study will use election results and data and polling data to help us fill out the
narrative. This will use popular sources to examine how the media and the public
at large see the parties. Again, these are to gauge how the public at large views the
parties and what is going with them. Commentary provides another valuable source
of what other factors may be at work as well. It is important to note that while we
are looking at what issues matter today and why that is important, it is also essential
to look at other factors. Parties can struggle due to scandal, poor leadership, the
popularity of the incumbent government, and other factors. The case study allows
us to go in-depth with each situation and find the answers to explain each one.
Qualitative methods allow us to get a better sense of what is going on. While
quantitative methods can do many things and give a great deal of information, they
can leave us with an incomplete picture. There are gaps stemming from culture,
which is hard to quantify. Looking at cultural values often requires an
understanding of the history and characteristics of a society. The case study method
here can help us begin to tell the story of the decline of these parties and why it is
occurring.
Analysis
The analysis of each case will be done individually, and then what common
patterns emerge will be made in the conclusions. First will be Britain's Labour
Party, then the French Socialist Party, then the Social Democratic Party of
Germany, and finally the Democratic Party of Italy.
I-Labour Party of Britain
The Labour Party, founded in 1901, has been the main center-left party in
the United Kingdom since the 1920s. The party is currently the Official Opposition
and the second-largest party in the House of Commons, the elected and most
important chamber of the British Parliament. Labour was previously in government
from 1997 to 2010 under Tony Blair and then Gordon Brown. Since then, Labour
has lost four general elections in a row and in 2019 suffered its worst defeat in terms

of seats in 84 years. The party seemed just two years earlier to be a comeback path
but now is back in the political wilderness.
Labour was founded in 1901 with the express intent to represent the
working class and has long been tied with Britain's trade unions. It has always
sought to work within the political system and has never keen on more radical
action. This "shows all the hallmarks of Labour's historic attempt to establish itself
as a respectable part of the British political tradition" (Pearce and Kenny, 2015).
Labour has always attempted to have a form of "social patriotism" emphasized
throughout the party's history (Pearce and Kenny, 2015). This leaves the party in a
position where it seeks to implement socialism and advances Britain's interests.
Labour has been challenged recently by the rise of regionalist parties, especially the
Scottish National Party. Many have accused it of not addressing the concerns of
Scotland and other regions of Britain. Pearce and Kenny argue that two key pillars
of Labour's values have been undermined in recent years: "the primal values of
unitary sovereignty and parliamentary government – all of which have been
intrinsic to Labour's constitutional and national thinking – are facing serious threat"
(Pearce and Kenny, 2015). Labour's focus on material issues like opposition to
government austerity may not be necessarily problematic but appears to be causing
the party to suffer at the polls.
The party at the latest election in 2019 dropped from 40% of the popular
vote at the previous election to 32% of the popular vote and losing over 60 seats in
parliament. The main issue of that election was Brexit. Britain's decision to leave
the European Union was completed on January 31, 2020. Labour has been deeply
divided by the issue since the referendum in 2016. "The Labour Party has its most
left-wing leader since at least 1983, and the radical left is increasingly prominent at
all levels of the party" (McMenamin, 2019). Since the left in Britain has been
divided on the issue of Europe, this left of the party with an incoherent position on
the subject. The leader referred to above was Jeremy Corbyn, who has since
resigned. Corbyn supported the Remain side in the referendum, despite his
Euroscepticism. Labour has primarily embraced left-wing politics and wanted to
focus on issues like wages, public services, and nationalization. It has even attracted
some support from businesses concerned over the Conservatives' Brexit positions
(McMenamin, 2019). However, Labour has continued to be plagued by internal
division, incoherent messaging, and poor leadership. This points to a party that is
lacking an effective plan to address new issues facing these states.
II-French Socialist Party:
The Socialist Party of France was founded in 1970 and remains France's
main center-left party. They are the direct successors to the French Section of the
Socialist International (SFIO) that collapsed in the late 1960s (Cole, 2011). The
party has sat firmly on the center-left for decades and is easily distinguished from

the more radical sections of the French left, including the Communist Party and
France Insoumise (FI). The Socialist Party last held the Presidency of France from
2012 to 2017 with Francois Hollande. Hollande proved a highly unpopular
president and is widely believed to have caused his party's massive decline in
support. The party is currently the third-largest in the French National Assembly
but is no longer a significant force in French politics. The party even has speculated
that it may not put a candidate for the next presidential election. However, whether
the unpopularity of Hollande enough to explain the fall of the Socialists is
unknown.
The Socialist Party is slightly unusual because ideological preferences have
traditionally been fundamental to the party. "The Socialists' structural difficulty in
accepting the exercise of power as a persistent feature of its identity" (Cole, 2011).
The Socialists are the original SFIO and have always been more motivated by
ideological priorities than any desire to exercise power. When François Mitterrand
united various leftist parties into the modern Socialists, he promised an electoral
alliance with the other major force on the French left, the Communists (Cole, 2011).
The Socialist tradition in France has favored unity of the left and maintaining
ideological integrity. This means that holding elective office and maintaining
power has rarely been the main priorities for the French left. Also, the French
Communist Party was a significant force for much of the 20th century before fading
out in the 1980s and 1990s. This left the lane where the Socialists could compete
relatively narrow.
What can explain the recent electoral collapse of the Socialist Party and its
inability to recover? Many would attribute it to the deep unpopularity of the
previous president Francois Hollande who left office in 2017. Hollande proved
incredibly unpopular with him leaving office with just a 4% approval rating. His
attempts to reform the French economy and society ultimately failed. Hollande's
administration was rocked by economic upheaval and multiple terrorist attacks,
such as the November 2015 attacks in Paris. Hollande's position as party leader had
always been fairly weak since he seized back the party leadership after initially
losing it (Hanley, 2017). This left the party divided and constantly trying to fight
challengers from the left. One prominent challenger was Jean-Luc Melenchon, who
finished fourth in the 2017 presidential election. He emphasized a more left-wing
platform than the Socialists were willing to back, even with the leftist Benoit
Hamon as their candidate. On economic reform, "Hollande had tried to shift the PS,
furtively, to a more liberal line, he could only go so far" (Hanley, 2017). This likely
disgruntled many traditional supporters of the Socialists who also became
concerned by the rise of terrorism and migration into France. The Socialists never
adopted a coherent strategy to address this. Hamon wanted a softer line towards
Islam in France, but others favored a more conservative approach. With multiple

internal divisions and a highly unpopular administration, the party could not
withstand the electoral tidal wave that was Emmanuel Macron.
The Socialist Party is a product of decades of political evolution on the left.
The SFIO was reformed under the leadership of Francois Mitterrand into the
Socialist Party (Cole, 2011). The Socialist Party attempted to maintain its
traditional alliances on the left last doing under Lionel Jospin in the Plural Left
cabinet of the 1990s (Cole, 2011). However, the party has proven unable to cope
with the challenges presented to them in recent years. Francois Hollande likely
alienated the left with his attempts to push a more economically liberal line. Then
the party could not decide whether to maintain the reforms or not. Also, the wave
of terror attacks, increased migration, and concerns about Islam only further fueled
its decline. The party did not have a coherent position and was divided amongst its
members about what to do. It serves as an example that if a party fails to make up
its mind on issues relating to culture and immigration can lead to disastrous
consequences.
III-Social Democratic Party of Germany
The oldest of our four parties, the Social Democratic Party of Germany
(SPD), was founded in 1885. The Social Democrats have been Germany's main
center-left party since the foundation of West Germany in 1949 and the
reunification in 1990. The party has been in government since 2013 as the junior
partner in the coalition government led by its traditional rival, the conservative
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union. However, the party's support
has collapsed in recent years, and now polling indicates that if an election were to
be held, they would collapse to only about 16% and possibly behind the Greens
(POLITICO, 2020). What caused the SPD to sink to such low heights? If the party
were to achieve only 16% at the polls, it would be its worst result in the years since
World War II. The SPD's current situation indicates a party that saw its base
disappear and its support from the general electorate.
The Social Democratic Party of Germany has been considered a prime
example of a modern center-left party. This has some historical roots dating back
to the late 19th century. The SPD began life as a fairly typical Marxist party
dedicated to the overthrow of capitalism. Nevertheless, within a few years, it
evolved into a more reformist party dedicated to parliamentary action rather than
the revolution. The party had adopted the Gothenburg program in 1884 that
effectively abandoned the idea of a socialist revolution in Germany. "Tribute was
paid to Marxism, it was not fully understood or incorporated in the program"
(Marks, 1939), but the party lost its appetite for going to violent and likely illegal
means to achieve its goals. The party by 1914, "with its million members the largest
political party in the country and the largest socialist party in the world" (Marks,
1939). The party was driven by practical necessity to adopt a reformist rather than

revolutionary line. Despite its loyalty to the traditions of Marxism, it ultimately
decided that competing legitimately within the political system was a better
alternative to being repressed by the state. Germany was a rapidly industrializing
country, and a party was needed to address the needs of the working class. The
party ultimately emerged as one of the leading parties in the Weimar Republic
period but was brutally repressed during the rule of the Nazi Party. Following
World War II, the party returned to compete in the Federal Republic of Germany
or West Germany. Even after reunification, the party remained the major centerleft party and maintained its reformist platform.
This historical background gives insight into the mindset of the SPD and
why it believes in what it believes. The party has long relied on working-class
support to maintain itself electorally. However, the party has lost much of that
support and support from the electorate at large. "The SPD has, for many years (or
at least since the demise of the so-called 'Third Way'), lacked a social democratic,
voter-friendly vision for the future that convincingly addresses the key issues of
globalization, migration, and technological change" (Jun, 2018). The SPD has now
been government with its traditional rival, the CDU/CSU (a coalition of two
conservative parties), since 2013. The SPD has been perceived by many as being
little more than a slightly more left-wing version of CDU/CSU. The party has also
failed to provide much of a message that motivates voters to vote for it. Internal
dissension has also not helped matters much either. The party suffers from internal
division about how to best combat the issues facing Germany today. "Balancing of
individual responsibility and state solidarity has generated major controversies
within the SPD, which stem from Gerhard Schröder's Agenda 2010 social reforms"
(Jun, 2018). Thus, the party has seen its inability to clearly define what it stands for
hurt it at the polls.
With its incoherent messaging and the dominance of the CDU/CSU, the
SPD continues to find itself in decline. In the most recent parliamentary election,
the party dropped to just 20.5% of the vote, its lowest share of the vote since 1949
(IFES, 2019). The rise of the Greens in the interim is hardly a surprise to anyone
watching. The party has taken a strongly pro-migrant stance and harshly opposes
the far-right Alternative for Germany (commonly AfD). The SPD more confused
and confounding positions on these issues left many voters wanting something else.
It is important to note that the Left Party, which is a direct descendant of the former
ruling communist party of East Germany, has also hamstrung the SPD's support in
recent years. Germany's electoral system has allowed SPD to avoid losing its
position entirely, but it has made life more complex. "It is a defect of proportional
rules that voters cannot hold politicians or parties accountable for policy choices
made in multiparty coalition governments" (Rosenbluth and Shapiro, 2018). The
SPD has lost much of its working-class support, who no longer trusts the party and

now relies more on middle-class support to maintain its position within the
government.
The SPD is widely considered the first modern center-left party in Europe.
It gave up more revolutionary leanings in the 19th century to become a more
reformist and more electable party. However, it struggles with internal division and
lacks a coherent platform. The SPD also faces new challenges from the left (the
Greens and the Left) and the right (the AfD), which remove some of its electoral
support. Compared to a few years ago, where it was a party of the urban middle
class, the Greens now seem on the cusp of potentially joining a government led by
the CDU/CSU. The SPD has been hit by issues that are sometimes beyond its
control, like the popularity of CDU/CSU and a migrant crisis in 2015. Now, its
working-class base no longer seems to trust the party to look out for its interests.
The "centre-left party's room for maneuver has become even more limited" (Jun,
2018). They have angered many voters who see it as either too conservative on
migration and culture or too liberal on migration and culture. Either, the SPD finds
itself in a challenging position with a lack of trust from the public and likely having
to remain in government at least until whenever the current pandemic ends. The
SPD can serve as an example of when public trust is lost, as voters have a tough
time forgiving.
IV-Democratic Party of Italy
The Democratic Party of Italy is the youngest of the parties, only being
founded in 2007. The party formed out of a coalition of various left-wing parties
that eventually coalesced into the Democratic Party. This included former elements
of the Italian Communist Party that collapsed in the early 1990s and Catholic leftists
formerly part of the Lega Democratica (Biondi, 2016). As Biondi points out, the
roots of the Democratic Party date back to the opposition to Silvio Berlusconi and
his conservative coalition. "In 1996 the heirs of the Italian Communist Party (PCI)
together with a segment of the former Christian Democratic Party (DC) formed an
electoral alliance and ran against Silvio Berlusconi" (Biondi, 2016). The
Democratic Party leads a coalition of leftist parties known commonly as the centerleft coalition. The Democratic Party is currently the second-largest party in Italy's
parliament and forms the government with the Five Star Movement. However, its
current support is at 21%, while its coalition partner has fallen even further to only
about 12% (Politico, 2020).
One cannot talk of the Democratic Party without mentioning its most recent
leader, Matteo Renzi. Renzi took over the party in 2013 and eventually became
Prime Minister. He resigned as Prime Minister in 2016 but remains an influential
figure today. "Looking more closely at Renzi's impact on the internal organization
of the PD, the most relevant novelty is his "presidential" style of leadership" (Guidi,
2014). Renzi took a very centralized approach to the job of the leader of the party.

He usually had decisions approved by the party's board without consulting other
factions within the party (Guidi, 2014). Renzi never usually considered the views
of the minority in his decision-making. This caused the party to have a broad and
sometimes incoherent ideology. "At the "boundaries" of party ideology are rather
blurred and can be continuously redefined by the party leadership" (Guidi, 2014).
Renzi appears to have taken this approach to his approach as Prime Minister. He
already overhauled the electoral system in 2014 and then in 2016 attempted to
overhaul Italy's political system with a constitutional referendum completely. The
referendum was a failure and forced Renzi out as Prime Minister. "Mr. Renzi staked
his political future on his attempt to change Italy's cumbersome political system.
He wanted to strengthen the central government and weaken the Senate, the upper
house of parliament" (Alder, 2016). It appears that Renzi's attempts to further
solidify his control over the Italian political system only backfired and led to public
resentment against him and the party at large, leading to his downfall.
Nevertheless, this alone cannot be the only explanation for the party's recent
struggles. Indeed, Italians were not happy about the government's attempts to
centralize power within the central government in Rome, but it seems that the party
is being punished quite harshly for one thing alone. Consider in 2013, the party won
the most votes and nearly tied with the center-right for seats, yet five years later, in
2018, the party dropped to just 21% of the vote and remained there in 2020 (IFES,
2020).
The issues that matter to Italian voters have shifted in recent years. During
the European migrant crisis, Italy was one of the major entry points for immigrants.
Immigration has dropped in Italy since its peak in 2014, yet it remains a significant
issue for Italian voters. The Lega Nord, the main right-wing party in Italy, took a
hardline stance on the subject in 2018. "The fight against illegal immigration was
the hallmark of the League's 2018 electoral campaign: (Di Maio, 2019). Any casual
observer could see that Italians were concerned with it. Even when the government
adopted harsher policies towards migrants, the concerns have not gone away (De
Maio, 2019). The Lega Nord continues to maintain a lead in polls despite the
decline in migration and them being forced out of the government last year. Renzi,
who is well known for pro-immigration positions, kept the Democratic Party on a
strictly pro-immigration platform, undermining its attempts to be a more catch-all
party. The Democratic Party expanded in the middle of the 2010s to appeal to a
much broader swath of the electorate. However, membership has been cut down by
voter concerns not seemingly being properly addressed by the party.
The Democratic Party has appeared to be the victim of its success. It
attempted to unite the left, which was largely successful. It has also managed to
keep the various faction of the Italian left ranging from former Communist Party
members to leftist Catholics within its coalition (Biondi, 2016). However, as it
expanded its appeal, the party also centralized to encourage stricter control. Italy's

political system is notorious for parties tearing themselves apart and splintering into
various factions. The Democratic Party is not a traditional working-class party as it
is more of a broad coalition of left-wing groups. However, it does rely on workingclass support, and it is not hard to see why immigration seen as a threat by the
working class would help cause the party's decline in support. While the party has
seen some recovery in the polls due to its handling of the current pandemic, it
remains behind. The Italian left had always been divided amongst themselves but
united to take on a resurgent right in the 1990s. For example, "Progressive Catholic
elites started to perceive themselves as closer to Italy's non-Catholic left-wing"
(Biondi, 2016). This union of various factions can be undermined when a leader
like Renzi attempts to centralize power too much in his position. This and the party's
maintenance of pro-immigrant positions likely explains why so many of the party's
more centrist and conservative supporters ended up abandoning them. The
Democratic Party, however, again does not fit neatly with the other cases. This is
because it is not a traditional working-class party but rather a broad coalition of the
left concerned with serving that class's interests. Thus, the Democratic Party does
serve as an interesting example of what could happen to any center-left party, even
if it is not a traditional working-class party.
Conclusions and Future Research
Ultimately what are the common patterns we see through all of our cases?
The main answer is significant changes in the issues that matter the most to voters.
While certainly economic issues remain important, there are increasing concerns
over immigration, national identity, and nationalism. This fits with our silent
revolution framework proposed by Inglehart and Norris. Originating with a series
of events in recent years, including the migrant crisis, Brexit, and the increasing
presence of Islam in Europe, what voters' value and care about has changed. This
factor, the changing in voter concerns, however, does not tell us the story entirely.
All of these parties have suffered from internal divisions and a lack of coherent
messaging. All four parties have faced fierce internal debates over their futures and
have yet to develop clear plans to respond to the changing political environment.
Party leaders also have not helped the situation, most prominently Francois
Hollande and his deeply unpopular presidency, which effectively crippled his
Socialist Party. Jeremy Corbyn's leadership was also considered incredibly poor.
So it appears that it is not only the increasing polarization of voters about issues
regarding post-material versus material values but also that party's internal issues
can also be highly influential. The working class may not be voting for these centerleft parties anymore, but it does not mean this will continue. Future research should
focus on the rise of new political parties on the left and right. It should also seek to
understand the relationship between the economy and the cultural changes.

Whatever the case of the decline of the center-left in the four countries is the result
of new issues becoming relevant or the decline of class politics and the internal
issues of the parties themselves. Things may change if the parties can overcome
these issues and make a better effort to address their traditional bases' concerns over
the last several decades. However, the choice to embrace a more post-materialist
vision might drive the party away from the working class. Alternatively, parties
may return to a more traditional, materialist approach while losing their progressive
supporters.
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